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The Thirteenth Finance Commission faces challenging times. Despite 
improvement, the fiscal situation continues to be a matter of concern when off budget 
liabilities and other fiscal risks are considered.  In the changing situation of increasing oil 
prices on the one hand and surge in capital flows on the other, calibrating the transfer 
system in tune with counter-cyclical fiscal policy stance is a formidable challenge. 
   
The paper argues that irrespective of the wording of the Terms of Reference 
(ToR), the Commission would do well to focus on its primary task of recommending 
transfers to serve the objective of equity and incentives.  While it is required to take into 
account a number of considerations, the focus should be on the transfer system.  As an 
impartial body, the Commission should make a fair assessment of the union as well as 
state governments, ignoring the asymmetries in the wording of the ToR.  
  
As regards the transfer system itself is concerned, the paper argues that 
although it may be difficult to make drastic changes in the relative shares of the states, 
the Commission should give up the gap filling approach. Instead, after recommending the 
tax devolution, the Commission should recommend grants to fully equalise expenditures 
on elementary education and basic healthcare.  It is also possible to incentivise the 
transfer system for even those states that have a better record of providing education and 
healthcare to improve quality of these services. If necessary, the tax devolution 
percentage can be appropriately adjusted to ensure equalisation of social services. 
  
  The paper is a revised and edited version of one that was presented in the 
seminar on Issues before the Thirteenth Finance Commission held at the National 
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  The appointment of the Thirteenth Finance Commission comes at a time when 
the fiscal situation, despite recent improvements, continues to cause concern. In addition, 
there are new challenges posed by emerging economic and political environment.  The 
Commission has to formulate its recommendations to resolve fiscal imbalances in the 
background of continued need to exercise austerity, surging capital inflows further limiting 
the degrees of freedom, imperatives of enhancing public investment in physical and 
social infrastructure to support higher growth, increasing inter-state disparities in 
development, and competitive populism from coalition politics. The recommendations of 
the Commission will have far reaching implications for the fiscal health of the union and 
state governments and, more importantly, for the future of Indian federalism. 
 
    The aggregate gross fiscal deficit relative to GDP is estimated to have declined 
from 8.4 percent in 2003-04 to 5.5 percent in 2007-08 and the revenue deficit during the 
period declined from 5.9 percent to 1.3 percent.  Improvement in the fiscal health was 
seen at both central and state levels.  Buoyed by spectacular increase in income tax and 
service tax revenues at the central level, central fiscal deficit was compressed by 1.3 
percentage points from 4.5 percent in 2003-04 to 3.2 percent in 2007-08 and revenue 
deficit from 3.6 percent to 1.4 percent during the same period.  Aided mainly by higher 
tax devolution and grants from the centre, partly from increased own revenues due to the 
introduction of value added tax and to some extent due to lower interest payments on 
account of debt swap and write off schemes, the state finances too have shown a 
significant improvement.  Aggregate states’ fiscal deficit has been reduced from 4.4 
percent in 2003-04 to 2.3 percent in 2007-08 and revenue deficit from 2.3 percent of GDP 
to a marginal surplus.  However, there are significant off budget liabilities at both central 
and state levels which could constitute an additional five percent of GDP (India, 2008), 
and when these are considered the fiscal situation looks alarming. 
 
  While, in general, state finances have shown a marked improvement, the 
situation in some of the states still remains grim.  In particular, revenue and fiscal deficits 
in some of the states is still a matter of concern and many of the poorer states have 
brought down their deficits by compressing developmental expenditures. Thus, the 
attempt at macroeconomic stabilisation has been at the cost of economic growth and 
justice, particularly in the low income states. 
  
  In addition to the above, there are significant fiscal risks which must be taken 
account of.  These include the impact of pay revision at the central level and on the 
states, possibility of significant increase in food subsidy in the wake of sharp increases in 
the prices of foodgrains, higher than budgeted expenditures due to increases in 
commodity (particularly fuel) prices, sharp increase in expenditures associated with the 
electoral cycle at both central and state levels and the revenue cost of lowering customs 
tariff to contain the prices of essential consumer goods.  In addition, increase in capital 
inflows and its sterilisation by the Reserve bank could create additional fiscal liability.   3
   
  The Thirteenth Finance Commission, like its predecessors is confronted with the 
task of making fiscal allocations between the centre and individual states in an 
environment of constrained fiscal space. In addition, the Commission will have a number 
of additional constraints.  The first is capital flows and RBI’s sterilisation policy limits the 
ability of the centre to effectively use monetary and fiscal instruments for macroeconomic 
stabilisation.  Even the limited flexibility in monetary policy calibration can be had only 
when the government restrains its own borrowing from the market.  Thus, wider space for 
monetary policy effectiveness requires setting even lower fiscal deficit targets than that 
was set by the Twelfth Finance Commission.
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  Equally concerning is the constraint posed by the fractured nature of polity.  The 
factors such as emergence of coalition governments at the centre with regional parties as 
pivotal members of the coalition, regional parties in power in the states and disharmony 
between the ruling parties at central and state levels have significantly altered policy 
perspectives (Rao and Singh, 2005).  First, the time horizon in policy making has shifted 
to the short run from more long term structural issues.  This has also led to the 
introduction of several schemes by the central government primarily to satisfy various 
coalition partners. The claim to ownership of these schemes has led to bypassing the 
states in their implementation and flow of funds, taking away the state level supervision 
and accountability.  Multiplicity of schemes at various levels, and poor information system 
has led to each agency taking a partial view of the various public services delivered.  The 
absence of holistic perspective has led to poor planning, inefficiency and waste in 
implementation and lack of accountability in public service delivery. 
     
  Political economy factors have impacted on the size and distribution of the 
intergovernmental transfers as well.  Failure to address the issue of equalisation in public 
services across the states in a systematic manner has led to growing regional disparities.  
The problem has been compounded by the disequalising regional policies (including 
central subsidies and tax expenditures) and various types of invisible transfers (Rao and 
Mandal, 2008; Rao, 1997).  Among other reasons, the growing regional disparities have 
led to adoption of political solutions though schematic assistance and introduction of 
mechanisms such as backward area grants instead of tackling the fundamentals. 
   
  The Finance Commission will have to formulate its recommendations when tax 
reforms are still underway and the regime is still unsettled.  The architecture and 
engineering aspects of the proposed Goods and Services Tax (GST) will impact on the 
nature of intergovernmental transfers not only because it will determine the revenue 
productivity of the tax system but also the way in which revenues accrue to the two levels 
of government and their distribution among the states. 
   
  India has reached a higher growth trajectory and yet, a number of states have 
lagged behind.  Inclusive growth in a globalising environment requires, besides 
institutional and governance reforms, significant additional investments in physical 
infrastructure and human development.  In a liberalised market environment, private 
investments will flow to states with better market institutions, physical infrastructure and 
human development.  Not surprisingly, inter-state disparities in development have shown 
a significant increase since economic reforms have been initiated.  This does not bode 
well for the future of Indian federalism.  Surely, equalising incomes is not the objective of   4
intergovernmental transfers.  However, inclusive growth requires ensuring a level playing 
field to attract investments by offsetting fiscal disabilities of poorer states which is a 
legitimate objective of the transfer system which squarely is the responsibility of the 
Finance Commission.  The past Commissions have abdicated this responsibility, but the 
present Commission cannot, in view of large and growing disparities.  It is also important 
to create a proper incentive structure which will not only enable the states to provide 
comparable levels of public services at comparable tax rates and improve their tax effort 
and expenditure efficiency.  
  
  The Finance Commission will have to formulate its recommendations in the light 
of the above challenges. The paper is divided into five sections.  Section 2 undertakes a 
detailed analysis of the terms of reference.   Section 3 will discuss the recent fiscal trends 
in central and state finances to understand the background in which the Finance 
Commission has to formulate its recommendations.  In the given environment, the 
approach the Finance Commission could take to deal with the primary terms of reference 
(ToR) is discussed in Section 4.  The last section summarises the major issues before 
the Commission and the approaches to deal with them. 
 
 
II. Terms of Reference (ToR) 
 
 
There has been considerable consternation on the ToR given to the past and 
present Finance Commissions.  Concerns about the ToR relate to the intrusion into the 
constitutional role of the Finance Commissions, requiring the Commission to undertake 
tasks not strictly within its purview, directing the Commission on the approach and 
methodology to be adopted and issuing guidelines for asymmetric treatment of centre 
and states.   While the resentment on the encroachment on the role of the Commission 
has been a matter of debate right from the Fourth Finance Commission when the 
Commission was not asked to take into account the plan side of the state budgets, the 
debate became particularly intense after the Ninth Finance Commission.
2  
  
  The founding fathers of the Constitution were careful to specify the tasks of the 
Commission to ensure that it fulfils its basic mandates specified in Article 280 (3) of the 
Constitution, which are: 
 
(a)  the distribution between the union and the states of the net proceeds of 
taxes which are to be or may be divided between them and the allocation 
between the states of the respective shares of such proceeds; 
(b)  the principles which should govern the grants in aid of revenues of the 
states out of the Consolidated Fund of India; 
(b  and  c)  the measures needed to augment the Consolidated Fund of a state to 
supplement the resources of the panchayats and municipalities in the state 
on the basis of the recommendations made by the Finance Commission of 
the state; and 
(d)  any other matter referred to the Commission in the interest   of sound 
finance. 
   5
Article 280 (4) further states, “The Commission shall determine their procedure 
and shall have such powers in the performance of their functions as Parliament may by 
law confer on them”.   
 
A close reading of the Article 280 shows that: 
 
(i)  The basic mandate of the Commission is to recommend a fair distribution of 
resources between the centre and the states and among the states inter-se.  
Of course, the distribution of resources has to be achieved in a sustainable 
manner.  Macroeconomic stabilisation is predominantly a central function and 
the constitution arms it with sufficient powers to carry it out – to control 
money supply as well as subnational borrowings.  The responsibility of 
ensuring this task can not be passed on to the Finance Commission.  Even if 
the ToR entrusts this task to the Commission, it cannot make 
macroeconomic stabilisation its primary task.  Offsetting horizontal and 
vertical imbalance is the basic mandate and it is obvious that this has to be 
done within the overall framework of a stable economy. 
(ii)  Article 280 of the Constitution empowers the Commission to evolve its own 
approach and methodology.  In fact, on the ToR issued to the Ninth Finance 
Commission that the Commission shall adopt “normative” approach, the First 
Report of the Ninth Finance Commission refers to the reply written by the 
Chairman to the Chief Minister of Kerala allaying his apprehensions that “…it 
was the Commission’s prerogative to adopt such approach and method as it 
considered fit and appropriate on subjects covered by (a) and (b) of Article 
280(3) of the Constitution.  In view of the Presidential notification, however, 
he clarified that the Commission would consider inter alia, adopting a 
‘normative approach’ wherever appropriate in the interest of sound finance.  
By doing so, the Commission would apply a uniform, just and equitable 
yardstick both to the Centre and the States.”  (India, 1989, p.3). 
(iii)  “Any other matter entrusted to the Commission” is not an omnibus residual 
provision.  It has to be “in the interest of sound finance” and should relate to 
the issue of the basic task.  Over the years, the government has developed 
the tendency of entrusting several issues it is unable to resolve to the 
Commission. Within the limited period at its disposal, the Commission cannot 
deal with such wide ranging matters as fiscal reform and restructuring 
programme, tax reforms, expenditure reforms, administrative reforms, debt 
relief, wage reforms, decentralisation reforms, disaster relief and 
environmental protection.  Entrusting the Commission with too many tasks 
would only result in the Commission diluting its focus on the main task.  
(iv)  Over the years, the ToR have been framed to improperly restrict the scope of 
the Commission also. The most important transgression was in restricting its 
role to the non-plan revenue accounts of the states.  The second and third 
Commissions were asked to take account of the plan revenue expenditures.  
However, in the case of the Third Commission, the government rejected the 
majority recommendation taking account of 75 percent of the plan 
expenditure and accepted the minute of dissent by the Member-Secretary 
that excluded the plan side altogether.
3 The Fourth Commission was not 
specifically asked to take account of plan expenditures and the Commission 
was more than willing to vacate the field when it stated, “… The terms of   6
reference of the Fourth Finance Commission do not expressly mention plan 
expenditure. The Constitution does not make any distinction between plan 
and non-plan expenditure and it is not unconstitutional for the Finance 
Commission to go into the whole question of the total revenue expenditure of 
the States…..”  Nevertheless, the Commission decided that “…..it would not 
be appropriate for the Finance Commission to take upon itself the task of 
dealing with the States’ new Plan expenditure”. The ToR of the Fifth Finance 
Commission specifically directed it to confine its scope to the non-plan side.
4 
Subsequently, except for the Ninth and the Thirteenth Commissions, the ToR 
confined the role of the Commissions to assessing non-plan revenue side 
requirements of the states.  Taking such a lopsided view of the requirements 
has not done any justice to the constitutional mandate of the Commission. 
   
The issue gains importance in the wake of overlapping roles of multiple agencies 
making transfers. Such transfers often by-pass the states, although relating to subjects 
within the States’ domain. Analysis shows that the proportion of transfers made through 
Finance Commissions’ recommendations have declined over the years (Table 1) and 
more important by the formula based transfers have significantly declined relative to other 
types of transfers. The decline can primarily be traced to plan grants; formula based 
transfers for state plan schemes constitute just about 27.5 percent in 2008-09 as 
compared to over 80 percent a decade ago.  
 
Table 1: Composition of Central Transfers to States 









































 Fourth Plan  54.4  10.3  64.6  12.9  11.6  24.4  11.1  100.00 
 Fifth Plan 
(1974-79) 50.2  17.1  67.3  17.7  11.7  29.4  3.3  100.00 
 Sixth Plan 
(1980-85)  57.0 5.1  62.1  17.7  16.6  34.3  3.6  100.00 
 Seventh Plan 
(1985-90) 54.2  6.9  61.0  17.0  18.1  35.1  3.9  100.00 
 Annual Plan  
(1990-91) 52.2  10.5  62.7  17.4  16.8  34.2  3.1  100.00 
 Eighth Plan 
(1992-97)  55.6 6.2  61.8  20.4  15.4  35.8  2.5  100.00 
 Ninth Plan 
(1997-2001) 58.7  6.0  64.7  20.0  10.6 27.1 4.9  100.00 
Tenth Plan 
(2002-2007) 53.2  8.6  61.9  20.3  11.8 32.1 6.1  100.00 
Source: Finance Accounts of state governments.  
    
The founding fathers of the Constitution, in order to ensure that the states should 
not be made to depend on the munificence or arbitrary will of the centre, constructed a 
scheme of transfers involving articles 275 and 280 (3).  The wording of the Article 280 
that the “President shall appoint a Finance Commission” and the Commission shall make 
recommendations to the President bestows on the Commission the role of a 
constitutional authority to deal with the task of effecting a fair distribution of resources.   7
     
As persuasively argued by K. K. Venugopal while presenting his views to the 
Ninth Finance Commission, both the positive interpretation of Article 275 and analysis of 
the non-obstante clause of Article 282 lead to the conclusion that prevailing practices with 
respect to central transfers to states are contrary to the constitutional provisions.
5  The 
positive construction of Article 275 shows that the central government can give all types 
of grants – general purpose or specific purpose, plan or non-plan and revenue or capital 
grants.  As grants under Article 275 are awarded by the Finance Commission, it is fully 
competent to make recommendations on all the above.  At the same time, it is not 
possible to visualise Article 282 as a residuary power to the Centre to give grants.  The 
non-obstante clause of the Article states, “…notwithstanding that the purpose is not one 
with respect to which Parliament or the legislature of the State, as the case may be, may 
make laws”.  This Article is not a miscellaneous provision but essentially meant to lift the 
bar for both the States and the Centre to make grants for any public purpose even on 
subjects beyond their legislative purview as listed in the union and state lists.   
Venugopal’s interpretation is that Article 282 can not be construed as residuary because 
it visualises that the grantors could either be the union or a state.  In his view, “…to the 
extent that any of the terms of reference seek to deprive the Finance Commission of its 
powers which are constitutionally vested in it under Article 280, Clause 3, the terms 
would be invalid and unconstitutional” (NIPFP, 1993; p. 274).  
   
Whether legitimate or otherwise, the development over the years have led to 
taking a segregated view of the states’ requirements with the Finance Commission 
concerned with only maintenance expenditures, the Planning Commission dealing with 
spending on new services and various central ministries spending on various schemes.  
This has led to a number of undesirable outcomes. First, there is a disconnection 
between investment and maintenance expenditures, and planning for service delivery, 
affecting the latter adversely. Second, the multiple agencies involved pursue their own 
goals and this has prevented a holistic treatment of equalisation.  Third, the preference to 
show large plan expenditures has led to significant under-provision for maintenance 
resulting in low productivity.  Fourth, the system has opened up scope for arbitrariness 
and discretion as over the years, formula-based transfers have shown a steady decline. 
The schematic transfers have invaded even the grants under State Plan Schemes and 
formula based transfers within the State Plan Schemes now constitute a mere 27.5 
percent. 
    
The ToR of the Thirteenth Finance Commission fortunately does not distinguish 
between plan and non-plan requirements.  This gives an opportunity for the Commission 
to take a holistic view. At least, it can look into the states’ requirements in social services 
in a holistic manner and has the opportunity to equalise expenditures on these services. 
 
The guidelines given to the Commissions in the ToR have always evoked 
considerable controversy.  However, these guidelines raise two important issues. First, 
macroeconomic stabilisation concerns have overshadowed developmental concerns in 
the guidelines issued to recent Commissions.  Thus, the Eleventh Finance Commission 
was asked to review the finances of the union and the states and suggest ways and means 
to restructure the public finances to restore budgetary balance and maintain macroeconomic 
stability” and it was asked to design a “monitorable programme of reducing deficits” after it 
submitted the report.  The Twelfth Finance Commission was asked to recommend a   8
fiscal restructuring plan by which both the union and state governments can phase out 
their revenue deficits and reduce fiscal deficits to a sustainable level.   Similarly, the 
Thirteenth Finance Commission has been asked to, “…suggest measures for maintaining 
a stable and sustainable fiscal environment consistent with equitable growth”
 6.  Although 
ensuring macroeconomic stability is an important objective and it is appropriate for the 
Finance Commissions to take sustainability into account while recommending transfers, 
should it be the primary focus of the Commission? 
  
If the Finance Commission prescribes the deficits for the ensuing five years, the 
basic question is, how does binding the governments with cardinal numbers on the fiscal 
deficit enable calibration of counter-cyclical fiscal policy?  If the fiscal deficit limits are 
determined in relation to the growth of GDP as was done by the Twelfth Finance 
Commission, would they remain relevant if the future growth rates of the economy were 
to be different from the assumed?  How can these mechanically derived numbers help in 
taking into account other exogenous factors (such as surge in capital flows) impacting on 
the fiscal stance? 
 
Stabilisation function is predominantly in the domain of the union government 
and assigning primacy to this task relegating redistribution of fiscal resources as 
secondary could create difficulties for both development and inter-regional equity.  When 
the Finance Commissions’ transfers fail to fully offset the fiscal disabilities and for 
macroeconomic stability reasons uniform borrowing caps are prescribed as was done by 
the Twelfth Finance Commission, the regional pattern of development could be severely 
distorted.  Uniform fiscal deficit target (linked to GSDP) constrains the poorer states’ 
borrowing and investment. The relatively weak social and physical infrastructure limits the 
flow of private investments to them and accentuates inter-state disparities.  
     
  Another important issue is the asymmetric treatment of the union and the states 
in the guidelines issued to the Commissions (Reddy, 2007).  The Thirteenth Commission 
has been asked to take into account the demands on the resources of the union 
government particularly on account of the projected ‘Gross Budgetary Support’ (GBS) to 
the central and state plans, expenditure on civil administration and defence, internal and 
border security, debt servicing and other committed expenditure and liabilities. However, 
as far as states are concerned, the ToR requires the Commission to take into account 
only “…the expenditure on the non-salary component of maintenance and upkeep of 
capital assets and non-wage related maintenance expenditure on plan schemes to be 
completed by March 31, 2010 and the norms on the basis of which specific amounts are 
recommended for the maintenance of the capital assets and the manner of monitoring 
such expenditure”. 
   
Does this mean that the Commission should take the total committed 
expenditures and liabilities of the centre as ‘non-negotiable’ but only the non-salary, 
capital asset maintenance component of the committed expenditures of the states?   
Does it also mean that while the maintenance expenditures of the central government 
need not be scrutinised, as far as states are concerned, norms should be specified and 
mechanism for monitoring these maintenance expenditures should be put in place?  The 
wording of the ToR shows a lack of sensitivity to federal values.  If the Finance 
Commission is intended to be an impartial arbiter, it can not take these guidelines 
seriously.  It may be futile to discuss the legitimacy or otherwise of the way in which ToR   9
are framed; the key issue is that the Finance Commission should take a balanced view in 
making its assessments. This implies that the legitimate requirements of the states for 
meeting committed expenditures on account of both salary and non-salary components 
should be taken account of as much as that of the union government, and the 
Commission should take an even handed approach in making the assessments.
7  
  
Further, should the Commission take the projected GBS for central and state 
plans as given and take this entirely as legitimate expenditures in its assessment?  Such 
an approach would not only be improper, but also will entail significant perverse 
incentives.  The legitimacy and appropriateness in respect of a number of plan schemes 
initiated by the Union government can certainly be questioned and pre-empting 
expenditures on them for assessing the resources available for distribution among the 
states would be inappropriate.  The founding fathers of the constitution have envisaged 
the Finance Commission to be an impartial arbiter in determining the resource allocation; 
it is necessary not only to be fair but also seen to be fair in its treatment of both union and 
state governments.  Thus, it would be appropriate for the Commission to follow the 
mandate given to it under Article 280, ignore those parts of the ToR that seek to restrict 
its scope and dictate its approach and methodology and adopt those in which the union 
and state governments are seen to be treated in a uniform manner. 
    
The ToR of the Finance Commission states that in formulating its 
recommendations the Commission should take account of a number of considerations.  
These include (i) analysing the impact of implementation of GST from 2010; (ii) 
“measures required to improve the quality of expenditures to obtain better outputs and 
outcomes”; (iii) management of ecology, environment and climate change consistent with 
sustainable development the implications of ecological management and climate change; 
and, (iv) measures needed to ensure commercial viability of irrigation projects and 
departmental and non-departmental public enterprises.  
    
These tasks are very important, but the main question is: is the Finance 
Commission the right institution to resolve all these issues and to what extent it should 
digress into these issues within the limited time period at its disposal?  Should the 
Commission be the body to decide on the nature of carbon taxes?  Should they function 
as the tax reforms commission in deciding the nature of GST to be levied as also 
expenditure reforms commission to ensure allocative and technical efficiency in 
expenditure?  It should be noted that the Commission is required to take account of these 
guidelines while making its recommendations on tax devolution and grants.  The practical 
approach would be to take the existing knowledge and information on these 
considerations; it need not take them as paramount and concentrate on them at the cost 
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III. Fiscal Consolidation: Centre and States  
 
a.   Aggregate fiscal consolidation 
 
The fiscal situation in the country has shown a remarkable improvement in recent 
years. The consolidated gross fiscal deficit relative to GDP declined from 9.9 percent in 
2001-02 to 6.4 percent in 2006-07 and further to 5.4 percent in 2007-08, an improvement 
of 4.5 percentage points (Table 2). It is budgeted to decline further to 4.6 percent in 2008-
09. The improvement in revenue deficit is even more impressive as it declined from 7 
percent of GDP in 2001-02 to 0.9 percent in 2007-08(RE) and is budgeted at 0.5 percent 
in 2008-09.  Outstanding debt of central and state governments, however, declined only 
marginally from 76.4 percent in 2001-02 to 75.5 percent in 2007-08. 
  
This turnaround in the fiscal situation has become possible due to improvements 
both at central and state levels. The improvement at both the levels started from the 
beginning of the decade, though after the fiscal restructuring plan was implemented in 
2003-04, it gathered pace.  The improvements conform to the fiscal responsibility 
legislations enacted by the centre and 26 state governments, though there are questions 
on the quality of adjustments, significant off-budget liabilities and impending fiscal risks.  
Nevertheless, it is fair to state that there has been significant improvement in reducing 
fiscal and revenue deficits at both central and state levels.   
 
 
Table 2: Fiscal Indicators of Central and State Governments 
(Percent of GDP) 




















1996-97 1.18  0.85  2.72  2.39  -0.20 4.10  3.60  1.30  6.40 
1997-98 1.07  0.93  2.90  3.05  0.50 4.80  4.10  2.10  7.30 
1998-99 2.51  2.20  4.27  3.85  0.70 5.10  6.40  3.70  9.00 
1999-00 2.78  2.39  4.72  3.49  0.75 5.40  6.30  3.80  9.50 
2000-01 2.54  1.81  4.25  4.08  0.93 5.70  6.60  3.70  9.50 
2001-02 2.59  1.47  4.21  4.41  1.47 6.20  6.99  3.68  9.93 
2002-03 2.24  1.28  4.15  4.38  1.11 5.90  6.63  3.09  9.56 
2003-04 2.21  1.49  4.45  3.56  0.00 4.50  5.76  2.05  8.48 
2004-05 1.16  0.68  3.49  2.50  -0.10 4.00  3.67  1.36  7.51 
2005-06 0.08  0.12  2.52  2.60  0.40 4.10  2.66  0.94  6.71 
2006-07   0.03  0.40  2.77  1.90  -0.20 3.40  2.05  0.79  6.41 
2007-08 
(RE) 
-0.47 0.11 2.29  1.35  -0.60 3.06  0.89  -0.50  5.35 
2008-09 
(BE) 
-0.55 0.07 2.11  1.04  -1.08 2.51  0.49  -1.01  4.62 
Source: Budget Documents, Government of India, and Finance Accounts, State Governments 
 
At the central level, fiscal deficit as a ratio of GDP declined from 6.2 percent in 
2001-02 to 4.5 percent in 2003-04 and further to 3.06 percent in 2007-08 (RE) and is   11
budgeted at 2.5 percent in 2008-09.  Similarly, centre’s revenue deficit relative to GDP 
declined from 4.4 percent in 2001-02 to 1.35 percent in 2007-08 and to about one 
percent in 2008-09 (BE).  The improvement is seen not only in the magnitude but also in 
the quality of deficits.  The ratio of revenue deficit to fiscal deficit, which shows the extent 
to which borrowed funds are used to finance current spending, declined from 78 percent 
in 2001-02 to 47 percent in 2007-08 and is estimated to be still lower at 41 percent in 
2008-09.  Although there is a slippage in achieving the revenue deficit target, it must be 
stated that the achievement has been impressive. 
   
Fiscal consolidation at the state level has been even more impressive. The 
aggregate fiscal deficit of the states relative to GDP declined from 4.2 percent in 2001-02 
to 2.3 percent in 2007-08 and aggregate revenue deficit declined from 2.6 percent to a 
surplus of 0.5 percent of GDP during the period.  Fiscal consolidation at the state level is 
more than the targets set in the fiscal restructuring plan of the Twelfth Finance 
Commission.  
  
To what extent should these improvements be credited to the fiscal responsibility 
legislations?  At the central level, the FRBMA was enacted in 2003 which set the targets 
for revenue and fiscal deficit reduction to the centre. Similarly, following the 
recommendation of the Twelfth Finance Commission, to gain from the benefits of debt 
rescheduling and write off, all the states except West Bengal and Sikkim have enacted 
Fiscal Responsibility Acts to phase out their revenue deficits and bring down their fiscal 
deficits to 3 percent of GSDP.  Therefore, it is natural to conclude that legislated fiscal 
discipline has contributed to fiscal consolidation in India. 
  
 A closer analysis of fiscal trends at central and state levels reveals that there are 
significant off-budget liabilities and revenue and fiscal deficit reduction claimed in the 
budgets are exaggerated.  In other words, the fiscal responsibility legislations have led 
the central and state governments to indulge in “creative accounting” to show lower 
deficits by pushing some liabilities outside the budget.  Underestimation of food and 
fertiliser subsidy is estimated at 2 percent of GDP.  The underrecovery of oil marketing 
companies is of even greater concern.  At USD 130/barrel, the central government may 
have to issue oil bonds worth 2.2 percent of GDP. Along with under-budgeted (pay 
commission and farm loan waiver) and under budgeted (NREGA) liabilities, the total off-
budget liabilities is estimated at about 5 percent of GDP.   Thus, despite improvements, 
when off-budget liabilities are taken into account, the fiscal situation no longer looks as 
healthy; this shows that the fiscal responsibility legislation has tended to push some of 
the liabilities outside the budget. 
 
b.   Improvement in Central Finances  
 
Can we attribute the actual improvement in the finances of central government to 
fiscal responsibility legislations? The Task Force on the Implementation of FRBMA 
worked out in detail the baseline and reform scenarios and set out the targets for revenue 
receipts, revenue expenditures, capital expenditures and revenue, and fiscal deficits 
based on the reform scenario. A comparison of the actual revenues and expenditures 
with the reform scenario is presented in Table 3. It is seen that while actual revenues 
were broadly in tune with the targets, the government failed to compress revenue 
expenditures according to the targets set and not surprisingly failed to achieve the   12
revenue deficit targets.  It is also seen that in order to achieve the fiscal deficit target, the 
government compressed capital expenditure from 2.4 percent of GDP in 2003-04 to 1.1 
percent in 2008-09, instead of increasing it as envisaged in the reform scenario. 
   
An analysis of the sources of fiscal improvement by the central government 
(Table 4) clarifies the picture.  The gross central tax revenue relative to GDP increased 
by 3.3 percentage points in 2007-08 over 2003-04 and as there was a decline in non-tax 
revenue by 0.8 percentage point, the gross revenue increased by 2.5 points.  Of this, 
higher tax devolution to the states claimed 0.8 percentage point and the net improvement 
in revenue was about 1.6 percentage points.  The lower interest rates due to the debt 
swap scheme resulted in the lower debt service payments by about one percentage 
point, of which about 0.55 point was available for deficit correction after adjusting for 
higher non-interest expenditures.  Thus, revenue deficit was compressed by 2.2 
percentage points in 2007-08 over 2003-04 mainly through increasing revenues by 1.6 
percentage points and reducing revenue expenditures by 0.55 point.  Of the revenue 
deficit improvement of 2.2 percentage points, 1.2 points was used to compress the fiscal 
deficit. 
 
Table 3: Targets and Achievements FRBMA 















Revenue Receipts        
Projected 9.49  9.96  10.27 10.78 10.99 11.18 
Actual 9.54  9.79  9.69 10.48 11.19 11.37 
 (Actual - Projected)  0.05  -0.17 -0.58 -0.30  0.20  0.19 
Revenue 
Expenditure        
Projected 13.09  12.42  12.03 11.85 11.31 11.03 
Actual 13.09  12.29  12.28 12.41 12.54 12.41 
(Actual - Projected)  0.00  -0.13 0.25 0.56 1.23 1.38 
Capital Expenditure         
Projected 2.34  2.97  2.87  2.9 3.17 3.27 
Actual 2.37  2.21  1.05 1.00 1.04 1.12 
(Actual - Projected)  0.03  -0.76 -1.82 -1.90 -2.13 -2.15 
Total Expenditure        
Projected 15.43  15.39  14.9 14.75 14.48  14.3 
Actual 17.04  15.94  14.18 14.07 15.11 14.16 
(Actual - Projected)  1.61  0.55 -0.72 -0.68  0.63 -0.14 
Revenue Deficit        
Projected 3.6  2.45  1.76 1.07 0.33  -0.15 
Actual 3.55  2.51  2.59 1.94 1.35 1.04 
(Actual - Projected)  -0.05 0.06 0.83 0.87 1.02 1.19 
Fiscal Deficit        
Projected 4.77  4.43  4.03 3.56 3.13  2.8 
Actual 4.46  4.02  4.11 3.44 3.06 2.51 
(Actual - Projected)  -0.31  -0.41  0.08 -0.12 -0.07 -0.29   13
Table 4:  Improvement in Central Finances 
 



























Gross Tax Revenue  8.20  9.20  12.47 4.27 3.28 
Non-tax revenue  2.97  2.78  1.99 -0.98 -0.79 
Gross revenue  11.17  11.98  14.46 3.29 2.49 
Shared taxes  2.35  2.44  3.27 0.93 0.84 
Grants 1.89  1.80  2.26 0.37 0.46 
Net  revenue  8.83  9.54  11.19 2.36 1.65 
Revenue expenditure  13.22 13.09 12.54  0.68  0.55 
Transfers to autonomous 
agencies 0.00  0.00  1.09 1.09 1.09 
Net Expenditure   13.22 13.09 12.54  0.68  0.55 
Net exp-grants  11.32  11.29  9.19 2.13 2.10 
Interest payments  4.71 4.49 3.39  1.32  1.10 
Revenue deficit  4.39  3.55  1.35 3.04 2.20 
Fiscal deficit  6.18  4.46  3.22 2.96 1.24 
             Source: Budget Documents of the Central Government (relevant years), Ministry of Finance, 
                          Government of India.  
 
Thus, the fiscal adjustment came about mainly through higher revenues.  Gross 
tax revenue of the central government as a ratio of GDP increased from 9.2 percent in 
2003-04 to 12.5 percent in 2007-08.  A detailed analysis shows that this increase was 
mainly due to increased revenues from direct taxes (2.7 percentage points) and partly 
due to increase in service tax revenues (0.8 point).   In fact, between 2003-04 and 2007-
08, revenue from direct taxes grew at 30.7 percent per year on average.  While the 
personal income tax revenue grew at an average rate of 29.9 percent per year, the 
growth in corporation tax was 31.2 percent.  As for indirect taxes, revenue from service 
taxes increased at about 60 percent per year on average, though the growth rate of 
excise duties was just about 8 percent. 
   
What contributed to such a high buoyancy of income tax revenues?  Acceleration 
in non-agricultural GDP was important but cannot fully explain the increase in revenue 
productivity.  This has to be attributed to improvement in tax compliance following the 
institution of Tax Information Network (TIN) and its implementation by National Security 
Depository Ltd (NSDL).  According to the Report of Comptroller and Auditor General 
(C&AG), in 2002-03, almost 80 percent of the TDS assessee did not file returns.  With the 
setting up of the TIN, the tax compliance has gone up significantly.  In other words, the 
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c. State  Government  Finances 
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, the state finances deteriorated sharply. The fiscal 
deficits in the states increased from 2.7 percent in 1996-97 to 4.7 percent in 1999-2000, 
and revenue deficits increased from 0.85 percent to 2.4 percent during the period (Table 
2).  Worsening was seen not only in the volume of fiscal deficit but also the quality of 
deficits deteriorated as the ratio of revenue deficits increased from 26 percent to 59 
percent. The states’ indebtedness relative to GDP increased from 21 percent in 1995-96 
to 30 percent in 2001-02. Attempts to contain deficits after the late 1990s resulted in 
compressing expenditures on social and physical infrastructures. The impact of these 
policy responses has been particularly harsh on the poorer states which are already 
lagging in infrastructure standards. 
      
  There are five important reasons for the declining fiscal health of the states in the 
late 1990s.  First, central transfers declined by one percent of GDP, following the decline 
in central tax revenues.  Second, the most important factor was the pay and pension 
revision of employees due to implementation of the Fifth Pay Commission.  It is estimated 
that the burden of pay and pension revision was about two percent of GDP.   Third, the 
pay revision at the state level came at the time when the growth rates in many states 
were low and states’ own revenues were stagnant.  Fourth, increasing government 
deficits and steady accumulation of debt have had adverse impact on the interest rates 
which caused significant increases in their borrowing costs.  Many states tried to manage 
the hardening fiscal situation by borrowing from expensive small saving loans.  Finally, 
the emergence of coalition politics in the centre and in the states and declining time 
horizon of political parties as well as politicians has led to continued proliferation of 
subsidies and transfers.  As a result, attempt to contain fiscal deficits invariably resulted 
in compressing productive expenditures on infrastructure. 
 
Since 2002-03, however, there has been a significant turnaround in state 
finances (Hajra, Rakhe, and Gajbhiye, 2008).   Although the reform conditionalities of the 
Eleventh Finance Commission were ill designed (Rao, 2003), state finances started 
showing steady improvement, thanks to higher growth rate of the economy and larger tax 
devolution  due to buoyancy of central taxes. By 2007-08, the states were well on course 
to achieve the deficit reduction targets set by the Twelfth Finance Commission (TFC). 
There was 3.1 percentage point reduction in the revenue deficit from 2.6 percent of 
GSDP in 2001-02 to a marginal surplus in 2007-08 (Table 5). The improvement resulted 
in reducing the fiscal deficit relative to GSDP from 4.2 percent to 2.3 percent during the 
period which meant that capital expenditures increased by about 1.2 percentage points.  
  
As in the case of the centre, it is difficult to attribute the improvement in state 
finances to the fiscal restructuring plan of the Twelfth Finance Commission. The plan 
required the states to pass fiscal responsibility legislations to phase out their revenue 
deficits, and reduce fiscal deficits to 3 percent of GSDP by 2009-10.   The progress in the 
reduction in revenue deficits was also linked to the writing off of the debt repayment to the 
central government.  While this has provided the direction in which the adjustment should 
take place, there is nothing to show that the sources of improvement can be attributed to 
these recommendations. 
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The analysis of the various sources of improvements summarised in Table 5 
shows that during the period 2001-02 to 2007-08, of the 3.1 percentage point reduction in 
revenue deficit relative to GDP, 2.1 points were due to increase in revenues and one 
point was from expenditure compression.  Within revenues, 1.6 percentage points were 
due to higher transfers. The states’ own tax revenues increased by 0.6 percentage point 
and this was achieved through the value added tax (VAT) reform, rationalisation of stamp 
duties coupled with boom in the real estate markets, and a general rise in tax collections 
arising from relatively higher growth of the secondary sector. 
   
On the expenditure side, the adjustment was only one percentage point and half 
of this was due to lower interest payments (Table 5).  Lower interest rates arising from the 
debt swap scheme adopted in 2004-05, lower volume of borrowings from the National 
Small Savings Fund and debt restructuring as per the recommendation of the Twelfth 
Finance Commission contributed to the improvement. Thus, much of the improvement in 
state finances has come about due to the higher transfers, but nevertheless, the 
improvement is likely to sustain in the medium term as revenue from central direct taxes 
are likely to show high buoyancy with progressive strengthening of the information 
system and reforms to introduce the GST. 
  














 2007-08  (RE)   
Fiscal deficit  4.2  2.3 (-)  1.8 
Revenue Deficit  2.6  -0.5 (-)  3.1 
Revenue Receipts  11.2  13.3 (+)  2.1 
Own tax Revenue  5.6  6.2 (+)  0.6 
Tax Devolution  2.3  3.1 (+)  0.9 
Grants 1.9  2.6 (+)  0.7 
Revenue Expenditure of which:  13.8  12.9 (-)  1.0 
Interest Payment  2.7  2.2 (-)  0.5 
Source:  Reserve Bank of India and State Budgets. 
Note: RE – Revised Estimates.   
 
Almost all the states have shown significant improvements in their fiscal health 
(Table 6). Both revenue and fiscal deficits have been reduced in every state except 
Kerala and Jharkhand among general category states.  It is interesting to see that 
general category states performed better than special category states in reducing fiscal 
deficit, but reverse was the case in revenue deficit.  Among the former, the low income 
states performed better in revenue deficit reduction, but the performance of high income 
states was better in reducing fiscal deficit. Both high income and low income categories 
of states brought down fiscal deficits by more than two  percentage points, but the latter 
category states increased their capital outlay by a larger magnitude (3.3 points) than the 
former (1.5 points).   16
Table 6: Fiscal Consolidation at State Level Since 2001-02 
Percent to GSDP 
   Fiscal Deficit  Revenue Deficit  Capital Outlay* 
























I. General Category States 
High Income States 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
4.28 3.09 1.18 1.83  -0.15 1.98  2.44  5.99  3.55 
Goa 5.82  4.57  1.24  3.22  -0.02 3.24  2.60  4.59  2.00 
Gujarat 5.27  1.80  3.47  5.45  -0.83 6.27  -0.18  2.63  2.81 
Haryana 4.32  1.18  3.14  1.66  -1.04 2.70  2.65  2.22  -0.43 
Karnataka 5.39  2.91  2.48  3.01 -1.42  4.44  2.37  4.43 2.05 
Kerala 4.22  4.70  -0.47  3.37 3.16  0.21  0.86 1.54  0.68 
Maharashtra 4.02  -0.10  4.12  3.02 -2.53  5.55  1.00 2.43  1.43 
Punjab 6.22  3.40  2.82  4.74  0.95 3.79  1.48  2.45  0.97 
Tamil Nadu  3.18  2.76  0.42  1.84 -0.34  2.18  1.34  3.10 1.76 
West Bengal  7.51  4.15  3.37  5.64 2.82  2.81  1.88  1.32  -0.55 
Average 4.85  2.28  2.56  3.38  -0.33 3.71  1.47  2.98  1.51 
Low Income States 
Bihar 4.47  3.49  0.98  2.28  -3.70 5.98  2.19  7.18  5.00 
Chhatisgarh 3.60  2.59  1.01  1.88 -2.63  4.51 1.73  5.22  3.49 
Jharkhand 3.89  7.81  -3.91  0.87 1.86 -0.99  3.02 5.95  2.92 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
4.20 3.24 0.96 3.64  -2.41 6.05  0.56  5.65  5.09 
Orissa 8.45  1.08  7.37  6.04  -1.63 7.67  2.42  2.71  0.29 
Rajasthan 5.21  3.47  2.80  4.14  -0.16 4.30  2.13  3.63 1.50 
U. Pradesh  6.28  3.00  2.20  3.25 -2.63  5.88  1.95  5.63  3.68 
Average 5.25  3.32  1.94  3.37  -1.86 5.23  1.88  5.17 3.29 
Average - I  4.97  2.59  2.38  3.38 -0.79  4.16  1.60  3.63  2.04 
II. Special Category States 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 
11.70 9.46 2.24  -2.62  -18.13 15.51  14.32 27.59  13.27 
Assam 3.79  4.39  -0.60  2.30  -0.13 2.43  1.48  4.51  3.03 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
8.81 4.28 4.53 5.02 0.14 4.87  3.80  4.14  0.34 
J & Kashmir  8.17  8.52  -0.35  1.85 -6.37  8.22 6.32 15.46  9.14 
Manipur 10.22  1.54  8.68 4.84  -15.88  20.72 5.38 17.42  12.04 
Meghalaya 4.79  1.08  3.70  0.73 -6.57  7.30 4.06  7.65  3.60 
Mizoram 21.70  4.24  17.46  13.38  -11.89 25.27  8.32 16.13  7.82 
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Table 6: Fiscal Consolidation at State Level Since 2001-02 (contd.) 
Percent to GSDP 
   Fiscal Deficit  Revenue Deficit  Capital Outlay* 
























Sikkim 5.88  11.60  -5.72  -12.58 -18.90  6.32 18.47 30.50  12.03 
Tripura 8.45  4.79  3.65  -0.86 -5.94  5.08 9.30 10.73  1.43 
Uttarakhand 3.83  4.78  -0.95  2.06 -3.29  5.35 1.77 8.07  6.30 
Average 6.38  5.12  1.27  2.40  -3.54 5.94  3.99  8.75  4.76 
All States  5.06  2.74  2.32  3.32 -0.95  4.27 1.74  3.94  2.19 
Note: Negative sign for both fiscal deficit (col.3) and revenue deficit (cols.5 & 6) indicates surplus 
          GSDP figures are projected using trend growth rate on last two available years; 
        * Capital outlay includes net lending 
Source: Finance Accounts and Budget Documents of state governments 
 
A closer look at the data (not reported here) to examine the sources of 
improvement in revenue deficit in each of the states reveals that an overwhelming 
proportion of improvement was due to increase in own revenues and higher central 
transfers. The former was relatively more important in high income states while for the 
low income states the relative importance reversed. There was hardly any compression 
of revenue expenditures even as the ratio of interest payments to GSDP in 2007-08 was 
lower than in 2001-02. In fact, the low income states used the opportunity provided by 
better fiscal situation to augment both revenue and capital expenditures on social and 
economic services. Since 2005-06, some of the states could also avail benefits of debt 
rescheduling and write-off recommended by the TFC. Significant improvement in the 
fiscal health since 2001-02 was also seen in the case of special category states.  The 
revenue deficit relative to GSDP was compressed by 5.9 percentage points on the 
strength of mainly higher central transfers. 
 
 
IV. Approach of the Commission 
 
 
a.    Shortcomings of the prevailing approach 
 
  The primary focus of the Finance Commission should be to make recommendations 
to resolve vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances.  Vertical imbalance refers to the 
mismatch between revenue raising capacity from the sources of revenue assigned and 
expenditure needs for the assigned functions.  Centre has comparative advantage in raising 
revenues and states, in expenditures.  Horizontal imbalance refers to the existence of inter-
state differences in revenue raising capacity and differences in the unit cost of providing 
public services resulting in violation of the principle of comparable public services at 
comparable tax rates.  The constitution recognises the existence of vertical and horizontal 
imbalances in the assignment system and mandates the President to appoint the Finance 
Commission to make recommendation on tax devolution under Article 270 and grants under 
Article 275 to resolve the imbalances. 
   
Although intuitively appealing, measurement of vertical and horizontal imbalances is 
beset with several difficulties (Bird, 1986) and judgements on norms are unavoidable.  The   18
analysis presented in Table 7 shows that own revenues of the states are adequate to 
finance only 56 percent of their current expenditures and the remaining was financed 
from transfers from above and this percentage has shown a declining trend.  The states’ 
share in total expenditures increased from 52 percent in 1990-91 to 58 percent in 2005-06.  
However, this does not signify an increase in decentralisation for, the spending financed by 
specific purpose transfer on which the states’ have little manoeuvrability have shown a sharp 
increase in recent years. 
 
Table 7: Trends in Revenue-Expenditure Imbalance at  




























               Current + capital expenditures.  RE:  Revised Estimates 
              Source:  Public Finance Statistics, Ministry of Finance, Government of India (relevant years). 
 
An important feature of Indian fiscal federalism is the significant inter-state 
differences in revenue capacity and consequently, per capita expenditures.  The information 
on per capita revenues and expenditures of the states for 2005-06 presented in Table 8 
brings out some important features.  First, there were wide inter-state variations in revenues 
in both per capita terms and as a percentage of Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP).  
These variations indicate differences both in revenue capacity and effort.  Second, although 
fiscal dependence of the states on the centre varied inversely with per capita income, per 
capita expenditures in high income states were substantially higher. 
   
There have been two important developments in the transfer scene.  First, the 
capacity of the Finance Commission to achieve the desired degree of equalisation has 
been constrained by the Planning Commission and various central ministries making 
grants for both general and specific purposes under Article 282.  Obviously, the Finance 
Commission does not have control over the distribution of these transfers, while the 
share of these transfers together has shown an increasing trend.  Second, the transfer 
Year Percent  of 
states' 




















1955-56 41.2 59.0 68.9 61.7 
1960-61 36.6 59.9 63.9 56.8 
1970-71 35.5 60.2 60.6 53.9 
1980-81 35.6 59.6 60.1 56.0 
1990-91 35.2 54.6 53.1 51.7 
1995-96 39.2 57.0 58.6 55.8 
1999-00 38.6 56.4 49.8 56.0 
2000-01 37.8 56.0 48.6 56.1 
2001-02 40.2 56.9 50.0 56.3 
2002-03 38.28 54.31 56.01 55.14 
2003-04 37.54 56.27 53.83 57.65 
2004-05 38.10 56.28 60.05 56.64 
2005-06 
(RE) 
37.07 56.59 56.07 58.10   19
system as a whole has become more and more discretionary. The normal assistance to 
State Plans given under the Gadgil formula declined from 85 percent of State Plan 
assistance in 1991-92 to 27.5 percent in the 2008-09 budget.  The consequences of these 
developments are: (i) the Finance Commission cannot take a holistic view of inter-state 
differences in public service provision; (ii) meeting the objectives of the transfers in the 
prevailing system is extremely difficult; and (iii) increase in the discretionary component 
reduces objectivity and credibility of the transfer system. 
 
Even within its limited scope, the methodology adopted by the successive 
Commissions has had adverse implications on both incentives and equity.  The approaches 
followed by the Finance Commissions broadly comprised of (i) assessment of overall 
budgetary requirements of the centre and states to determine the volume of resources 
that can be transferred during the period of their recommendation; (ii) forecasting states’ 
own current revenues and non-plan current expenditures;(iii) determining the states’ 
share in central tax revenues and distributing this share among the states; and (iv) filling 
the post-devolution projected gaps. 
 
The criteria employed by the Finance Commissions for recommending tax 
devolution and the methodology employed to determine the grants have been discussed 
extensively in the literature.  The most important are the equity and incentive implications 
of the transfer system which must be noted.  As the Finance Commissions take the base 
year numbers and make projections, the expenditures of poorer states with low base year 
numbers continue to be assessed at low expenditures.  This “tyranny of the base year” 
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Table 8: Selected Fiscal Indicators of States: 2006-07 
Per 
Capita 











Andhra  Pradesh  32533.0  4977.2 3788.0 1768.1  9.6 
Bihar   10286.0  2105.3  530.9  1952.9  4.8 
Chhatisgarh  26125.1  4439.6 2974.4 2279.7  9.0 
Goa  95663.5  15460.0 9446.7 2886.7  8.3 
Gujarat  44332.5  4558.4 4056.2 1432.1  7.5 
Haryana  48213.8  5717.8 5736.0 1008.9  9.3 
Jharkhand  23591.2  3992.0 1542.9 1888.3  4.5 
Karnataka  36037.8  5173.7 4567.3 1733.4  11.7 
Kerala  39742.1  4243.7 3841.6 1773.4  9.0 
Madhya  Pradesh 18984.1  2872.0 1863.2 1841.9  8.0 
Maharashtra  46307.9  4587.2 4235.6 1383.3  8.2 
Orissa  25997.6  2649.9 1945.3 2568.5  5.7 
Punjab  43436.1  4885.9 4362.7 1612.2  8.5 
Rajasthan  22210.8  3201.1 2301.3 1735.7  8.1 
Tamil  Nadu  37635.2  4698.3 4729.4 1454.0  11.4 
Uttar  Pradesh  16308.2  2368.9 1607.7 1631.9  8.1 
West  Bengal  30739.3  2419.5 1598.7 1550.0  4.8 
General Category  
States  28867.0  3606.4 2790.6 1691.0  8.3 









Assam  21947.7  4579.9 1793.1 3749.5  5.6 
Himachal  Pradesh  43535.4  7541.5 3690.8 6996.9  5.4 
Jammu & Kashmir  26334.2  8067.3  2279.1  8611.8  6.6 
Manipur 27992.3  9821.7  1195.7  11795.7  1.7 
Meghalaya  28342.6  7399.5 1772.5 8102.9  3.8 
Mizoram 27820.5  16250.0  1820.0  18100.0  2.3 
Nagaland 27740.1  9209.1  918.2  11545.5  1.9 
Sikkim 34820.6  22764.5  4488.1  21177.5  6.4 
Tripura  29500.1  6600.0 1247.1 8108.8  3.5 
Uttarakhand  30956.0  6426.9 3203.2 4154.8  8.2 
Average: Special 
Cat.  States  27189.0  6729.8 2197.1 6375.8  5.6 
Average:  All  States  28762.5  1962.0 1421.2 1023.9  8.1 
             Source:  1. Reserve Bank of India Bulletin,  
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Table 9: Equalisation in Fiscal Transfer System in India – 2005-06 
 
  Finance Commission Plan Transfers 











































2  0.607 0.477  -0.07  -0.063 -0.07 0.381 
Note:  Estimated by employing the functional form:  Ln G = α + β  Ln Y+ ∈, where G denotes different types of per capita 
transfers, Y represent per capita GSDP, α and β represent parameter estimates and ∈ is the error term.  
* Significant at 1 percent level. 
 
Despite this, Finance Commission’s transfers are the most equalising among the 
three different transfer categories (Table 9).  The log-linear regressions of per capita 
transfers on per capita GSDP for the cross section of general category states (excluding 
the small state of Goa) in 2005-06 shows that only the Finance Commissions have a 
significant equalising impact with the elasticity of (-) 0.53 largely due to the progressive 
distribution of tax devolution recommended by the Finance Commission.  Grants for State 
Plan as well as Centrally Sponsored Schemes have no equalisation impact whatsoever 
and the equalisation seen in the transfer system is mainly due to Finance Commission 
transfers. 
   
Despite progressive distribution, the transfer system fails to offset the fiscal 
disabilities entirely and this is shown in Figure 1.  Although transfers reduce inter-state 
inequalities in per capita revenue accruals and per capita expenditures, significant 
inequalities in revenues accruing and expenditures still persist and these are positively 
related to per capita GSDP. 
 
Failure to offset the relative fiscal disabilities of the states fully is brought out in 
Table 10. Taking all-state average annual per capita expenditure as the norm, 
expenditure requirements are estimated for the period 2003-04 to 2005-06.  Similarly, 
taking all-state average revenue-GSDP ratio, normative revenues are estimated.  The 
gap between the normative expenditures and revenues are then adjusted for the 
transfers from the centre to the states to arrive at the residual gap.  It is seen that the 
residual gap as a ratio of GSDP was the highest in the case of Bihar (40.6 percent) 
followed by Uttar Pradesh (21.7 percent) and in general, the poorer states had larger 
gaps.  Although these estimates are not scientific, they substantiate the general point that 
the transfer system has failed to ensure a level playing field for the poorer states.  
 
The inability to offset fiscal disabilities has caused significant inter-state differences 
in spending on basic public services.  The analysis of expenditures presented in Table 11 
shows that inter-state differences in per capita expenditures are not only high in all cases, 
but have actually increased in education and health expenditures as measured by the 
coefficients of variation.  It is also seen that the correlation of per capita expenditures on 
education, health, total social services, and economic services as well as aggregate   22
expenditures with per capita NSDP is high and significant.  Together with increasing 
coefficients of variation, these results show that per capita expenditures are higher in 
high income states and differences in per capita expenditures between low income and 
high income states have steadily increased over the years.   
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Table 10: Normative Resource Gap of Major States with Averages as Norms 
 
















































Pradesh  4750.59 9.58  19213.56  43121.88  11.25 6.68 
Bihar 1874.66  5.01  6645.07  48088.49  56.40  40.55 
Chhatisgarh 5979.75 9.74  4151.71  7539.78  7.38 1.15 
Goa 16747.17  14.74  1000.31  776.06  -2.03  -4.24 
Gujarat  5322.18 8.67  17210.37  29180.55  6.29 3.83 
Haryana 5216.41  10.10  8515.47  12317.08  4.04  2.35 
Jharkhand 2903.07  6.65  4893.05  15547.51  19.69  13.50 
Karnataka 9780.22  11.86  13500.25  15249.16  1.17  -3.09 
Kerala  5353.85 9.01  9708.75  17831.92  7.57 4.08 
Madhya 
Pradesh 3683.61  9.73  9840.75  35105.30  23.22  16.23 
Maharashtra 5525.56 8.76  34629.43  55635.14  5.49 3.67 
Orissa 3457.69  7.74  6372.31  20789.68  20.46  11.51 
Punjab  5982.12 9.61  8953.33  13878.23  4.97 2.86 
Rajasthan 3910.06  9.22  10584.59  32908.22  19.07  12.94 
Tamil Nadu  5100.07  10.86  18093.45  34939.13  8.42  4.99 
Uttar 
Pradesh 3087.61  7.42  22713.53  96777.29  29.49  21.72 
West  Bengal  3540.72 5.05  19103.77  45507.19  12.50 8.05 
 
 
  Inequalities in expenditures on social and economic services cause inequalities 
in these services. Thus, the children in states with low literacy rates have poor access to 
school education and people in states with low health status have low levels of 
expenditures on medical and public health.  Similarly the states with low infrastructure 
levels spend less on infrastructure. This pattern of spending increases inequalities in 
social and physical infrastructure and reinforce inequalities in development.  Thus 
inability to place the poorer states on a level playing field in regard to infrastructure 
provision combined with poor development of market institutions in these states has 
contributed to growing inter-state inequalities in levels of living. 
 
Not surprisingly, inter-state disparities among the general category states are not 
only high, but have shown an increasing trend (Rao, 2008). In 1980-81, the per capita 
SDP in the richest state, Punjab (Rs 2674) was about 2.9 times that of the poorest, Bihar 
(Rs 919). In 2006-07, this difference increased to 4.8 times with per capita SDPs of 
Haryana, the highest income state at Rs. 48214 and Bihar at Rs. 10286 (Table 9).  It is 
also seen that per capita income levels have tended to diverge sharply after market-
based reforms were initiated. (Rao et al, 1999).  With economic liberalisation, the states 
with better access to factor and product markets and better transport infrastructure and   25
connectivity, were able to take greater advantage of the opportunities as compared to 
those with poor transport infrastructure and low levels of market development.  
 
The second major shortcoming of Finance Commission transfers is the inherent 
adverse incentives it entails which has been described as “fiscal dentistry” (Rao and 
Singh, 2005).  Projection of revenues and expenditures, even when sprinkled with some 
norms, provides disincentive to tax effort and incentive to expenditure profligacy.  Not 
surprisingly, the incentive is to have larger “cavities” and until the Finance Commission 
moves away from this approach, the perverse incentive will continue.   
 
Table 11: Inter-State Differences in Per Capita Expenditures 
 on Public Services 
 
Expenditure  Head  1995-96 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 
1. Education       
     a. Mean (Rs)   285.79  532.06  522.69  531.31  550.18 
     b. Coefficient of variation  0.35  0.45  0.40  0.47  0.48 
     c. Corr. coeff with per 
          capita NSDP  0.616  0.644  0.619  0.699  0.513 
2. Medical and Public 
Health       
     a. Mean  88.33  146.42  146.93  148.42  154.99 
     b. Coefficient of variation  0.27  0.45  0.36  0.34  0.35 
     c. Corr. coeff with per 
         capita NSDP  0.687  0.765  0.793  0.811  0.528 
3. Social Services       
     a. Mean  575.48  1030.51  1033.23  1060.39  1136.11 
     b. Coefficient of variation  0.40  0.42  0.32  0.33  0.37 
     c. Corr. coeff with per 
          capita NSDP  0.841  0.763  0.812  0.852  0.716 
4. Economic Services       
     a. Mean  514.74  827.85  821.69  854.21  1128.96 
     b. Coefficient of variation  0.38  0.58  0.49  0.42  0.34 
     c. Corr. coeff with per 
         capita NSDP  0.824  0.765  0.671  0.740  0.662 
5. Development 
Expenditure       
     a. Mean  1090.23  1858.36  1854.92  1914.61  2265.07 
     b. Coefficient of variation  0.33  0.47  0.37  0.36  0.30 
     c. Corr. coeff with per 
         capita NSDP  0.872  0.794  0.791  0.828  0.865 
6. Total Expenditure       
     a. Mean  1690.37  3059.30  3180.46  3348.41  3858.04 
     b. Coefficient of variation  0.37  0.45  0.34  0.36  0.31 
     c. Corr. coeff with per 
          capita NSDP  0.885  0.842  0.917  0.905  0.839 
Source: Estimated from expenditure data derived from Finance Accounts of states, Comptroller and Auditor General, 
Government of India.  
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b. Possible  Approaches 
 
  The Thirteenth Finance Commission has the opportunity to change the approach 
and make a significant contribution in the design of the transfer system to make it more 
equitable and incentive compatible.  It is important to design the transfers that would help 
to improve fiscal discipline at the margin, and should at least ensure that the states have 
resources to equalise basic services.  However, any approach that is adopted by the 
Finance Commission should be simple and by and large acceptable to the centre and 
states.   Unfortunately, the Commission is not writing on a clean slate and therefore, it is 
important to ensure that the transition is smooth and does not destabilise the budgets of 
individual state governments. 
     
  One possible approach is to take tax revenues at a ratio of GSDP and 
expenditures at average per capita while making the assessments as shown in the 
illustration in Table 10.  However, it is not correct to assume that the relationship between 
tax revenues and GSDP is linear.  Furthermore, taxable capacity is determined by not 
just GSDP, but a number of capacity factors.  Similarly, estimation of expenditure needs 
involves, besides population, the demographic composition of population, its density, and 
various environmental factors.  The attempt by the Ninth Finance Commission to 
estimate fiscal capacities and needs of the states was criticised on the grounds that it 
was too complicated.  In any case, adoption of such an approach would involve 
significant change in the inter-state distribution of transfers. It is doubtful whether the 
Commission can make such a drastic departure. 
 
  One feasible approach the Commission could adopt is to continue with the tax 
devolution as in the past and equalise social services such as basic education and 
healthcare completely. In fact, the Twelfth Finance Commission attempted to equalise the 
expenditures on basic education and healthcare but found that it did not have the 
requisite resources and ended up recommending grants to equalise 10 percent 
equalisation in basic education and 30 percent equalisation in health expenditures.  
  
 It is possible to estimate the expenditure needs of basic social services in a 
more scientific manner based on the physical norms relating to these services.  In the 
case of health expenditures for example, it is possible to estimate the required number of 
health centres and sub-centres, hospital beds, medical and paramedical personnel, and 
work out the costs.  A recent study by Rao and Choudhury (2008) provides a detailed 
methodology for estimating expenditure needs in respect of health expenditures.   
Similarly in the case of education expenditure, requirements in each state can be 
estimated separately for primary, secondary, vocational, and higher education. 
 
  Once the expenditure need is estimated, the Commission can work out the 
expenditures presently incurred from all sources – plan and non-plan.  Besides the 
expenditures incurred in the state budgets, there are central government expenditures 
incurred for various schemes (National Rural Health Mission, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan 
etc.) and after taking into account their inter-state distribution, the Commission can 
estimate the additional expenditure required for equalisation.  The equalisation grants in 
respect of these could be designed in an incentive compatible manner to ensure 
minimum standards of social services are provided in the states.  Full equalisation of 
expenditures on basic social services can be done if the grants are given to equalise   27
these basic services instead of filling the gaps.  Once social services are equalised, the 
state governments can borrow from the market to ensure minimum standards of 
economic services. 
   
  The approach outlined above has several advantages.  First, it will take a holistic 
view of the requirements in social services without making a distinction between plan and 
non-plan or revenue and capital.  Second, it will avoid the perverse incentives from the 
gap filling approach.  Third, it is possible to design the grants to ensure that the states do 
not substitute their own expenditures on these services.  Fourth, this will facilitate human 
development in poorer states by improving the standards of public services in them and 
contribute to increase in productivity.   
 
 
V.  Summing Up 
 
  The Thirteenth Finance Commission faces challenging times.  Despite 
substantial improvement, the fiscal situation continues to be a matter of concern when 
off-budget liabilities and other fiscal risks are considered.  In addition, the surge in capital 
flows and sterilisation of foreign exchange inflows by the Reserve Bank of India leaves 
very little room for manoeuvrability to pursue independent monetary policy. 
  
While macroeconomic stability is an extremely important objective, it is 
necessary to consider whether the Finance Commission should take this as a primary 
task. Surely, the Commission will have to consider the ability and flexibility of the central 
government in the macroeconomic management of the economy in formulating its 
recommendations on tax devolution and grants.  It should also consider building in 
appropriate incentive structure in its recommendations to provide incentive to the states 
for better fiscal management and penalise those that indulge in laxity.  All sustainability 
calculations involve judgements and the nature of the GDP growth projected.  However, 
to bind the central and state governments to the projected values can make calibration of 
counter-cyclical fiscal policies difficult. 
   
  Concern has been expressed on the wording used in the ToRs of the 
Commission.  The first issue pertains to the primacy of the task of the Commission itself.  
While many of the guidelines are important and should be taken into consideration while 
formulating its recommendations for tax devolutions and grants, they should not by 
themselves, become the primary objective.  More importantly, the Commission is an 
independent constitutional authority vested with the task of dividing the fiscal resources 
as an impartial arbiter and therefore, has to take into consideration the revenue potential 
of the centre and the states on the one hand and genuine expenditure needs of the 
centre and the states on the other, irrespective of the wording of the ToR. 
 
  The Thirteenth Finance Commission has the opportunity to assess the 
requirements of the states in a holistic manner without making a distinction between plan 
and non-plan sides.  In particular, it is opportune to take comprehensive requirements in 
social sectors such as basic education and healthcare to ensure comparable standards 
of services in these services across the country.  The requirement to spend more on   28
public education and healthcare in poorer states is all the more important due to the small 
presence of the private sector, particularly in the rural areas in these states.   
 
  It will be very difficult to change the shares of the states drastically in its 
recommendations.  However, it can make a paradigm shift to change the structure of 
incentives and accountability as an inherent part of the transfer system.  Thus rather than 
continuing with the “gap-filling” approach, the Commission can fully equalise 
expenditures on at least basic healthcare and education.  It is possible to design the 
transfer system to build in the incentives even to the states which have a better record of 
providing education and health to improve their services further from quantity to quality.  
If necessary, the tax devolution percentage can be appropriately adjusted to ensure 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1   Virmani (2007) argues that the fiscal deficit targets for 2013 should be set at 3 percent of GDP 
(1.5 percent each for the centre and states) as against 6 percent set for 2009 by the Twelfth 
Finance Commission.   
2   Some of the Finance Commissions themselves resented the restrictions imposed upon them 
from their constitutional mandate.  For example, responding to the restriction placed on the 
Fifth Finance Commission to confine itself to non-plan side of the states’ budgets, it stated, “As 
the language of the Article 275 stands, there is nothing to exclude from its purview, grants for 
meeting revenue expenditures on plan schemes nor is there is explicit bar against grants for 
capital purposes”.  However, it did not do so , “….as it would blur the entire division of functions 
between the Commission and the Planning Commission” (India, 1969, p.12)   
3    This is one of those rare cases where the Government did not accept the majority 
recommendation of the Commission. 
4   See footnote 2 above. 
5   The Ninth Finance Commission sought the opinions of N. A. Palkhiwala, K. K. Venugopal, and 
A. G. Noorani on the specific issue of the interpretation of Articles 275, 280 and 282 of the 
constitution.  The views of Noorani and Venugopal are available in the “Round Table 
Discussion” summarised in The Ninth Finance Commission: Issues and Recommendations 
(NIPFP 1993: 207-235).  
6   In this context it is necessary to point out the unusual procedure of requesting the Finance 
Commission “…to revisit the roadmap for fiscal adjustment and suggest a suitably revised 
roadmap” in the Budget Speech 2008-09 (p. 22) of the Union Finance Minister.   
7   Even when the approach is even-handed, the deviation of the actual estimates from those 
projected by the Commission can have different impact on the union and state governments.  
Therefore, Guhan in a lighter vein used to say that the Finance Commissions can only bark at 
the centre, but they bite the states! 
8   For details on this see, Rao and Rao (2006), pp. 104-05. 